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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

THE CHARGE TO THE JURY IN MARYLAND UNDER
THE NEW RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
By MoRRIS A. SOPER*
For a long generation the insignificant and ineffective
part played by the Maryland state judge in the jury trial
has been the object of trenchant criticism and attack.
Powerful addresses have shown that the judge's instructions on the law, consisting of technical requests or prayers
prepared by counsel, have been not only the greatest single
source of reversible error but ofttimes utterly useless and
unintelligible to the body to whom they were directed.1
Instructions on the facts have been conspicuous by their
complete absence; and as Governor Ritchie said of our
State practice, when as a young lawyer his great talents
had already been recognized: 2
"The Court makes no comment whatever upon the
evidence; says nothing upon its weight, however strong
or weak that may be; nothing about the credibility of
witnesses, however plainly it may appear that some
are truthful or others untruthful; and refrains absolutely from giving the jury any benefit from the
peculiar ability which the court's training and experience must give him of divining truth in the midst
of improbable or inconsistent testimony."
How this departure from the practice at common law
that was Maryland's heritage came about, the researches
of eminent lawyers of our time have failed to disclose.
Neither constitutional nor statutory enactment require the
practice that became firmly established more than a century ago and has since been continued under the decisions
of the highest state court. Today, however, an important
change, effective September 1, 1941, has taken place under
* A.B., 1893, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B., 1895, University of Maryland; United States Circuit Judge for the Fourth Judicial Circuit.
2Albert
C. Ritchie (1908) 13 Maryland State Bar Reports 130; Charles
McHenry Howard (1926) 31 Maryland State Bar Reports 120; Charles
Markell (1937) 42 Maryland State Bar Reports 72; Judge Robert F. Stanton (1938) 43 Maryland State Bar Reports 35.
'Ritchie, op. cit. supra.
'Howard, op. oit. supra, 127, et seq. Markell, op. cit. supra, 87, et seq.
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the General Rules of Practice and Procedure adopted by
the Court of Appeals of Maryland pursuant to Chapter 719
of the Acts of 1939. Trial Rule 6(b) now provides:
(b) Instructions. In its instructions to the jury,
which may be given either orally or in writing or both,
the Court, in its discretion,
(1) may instruct the jury upon the law of the
case, either by granting requested instructions
or by giving instructions of its own on particular issues or on the case as a whole or by
several or all of these methods, but need not
grant any requested instruction if the matter
is fairly covered by instructions actually given;
and
(2) may sum up the evidence, if it instructs the
jury that they are to determine for themselves
the weight of the evidence and the credit to
be given to the witnesses.
An oral charge need not comply with the technical
rules as to prayers.
Thus the Court of Appeals has taken down the barriers
which it erected long ago, and the extent to which the
trial judge may now go in his charge to the jury rests very
largely in his discretion. Under these circumstances it
has been suggested that some comment upon the practical
operation of the new procedure by one with judicial experience in state as well as federal courts would not be out
of place; and for this reason these pages have been written.
Since the initiative rests with the trial judge, it is
desirable first to look at the matter from his standpoint.
Although the new departure lays an increased burden
upon him, it may be assumed that he will not be reluctant
to make the necessary effort to bring his experience and
training to the assistance of the jury. Too long it has
been said that the average judge is not competent to perform this difficult task, for even his severest critic must
' Md. Code (1939) Art. 26, Sec. 35. The Rules, as promulgated by the
Court of Appeals, together with explanatory notes, were published in June,
1941, under the auspices of the various Bar Associations.
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admit that he is as well equipped to aid the jury as the
average lawyer who practices in his court. It is more to
the point to say that it is easier to aid the trier of facts to
reach the correct conclusion by making an impartial statement of the facts than it is to convince him by partisan
advocacy. Nor will it be too difficult for the judge, in
view of his special qualifications and the assistance which
counsel are always eager to render, to state the law of the
case in plain and simple terms far more helpful and intelligible to the jury than the technical, hypothetical and sometimes verbose instructions with which for the past century
Maryland jurors have been served. The difficulties need
not be minimized. They are in fact very real for it is
not easy to be didactic in the field of the law, as every one
has found who has ventured into law school work. But
the new responsibility will stimulate the judge to a far
greater interest in his trial work and in most cases will
develop a skill more than equal to the task; and if here
or there an incumbent who has come to regard the bench
as a haven of rest is disturbed, even then the administration of justice will be benefited.
SUMMING Up THE

EVIDENCE

The most radical departure from the prior practice is
contained in that portion of the rule which permits the
judge to sum up the evidence, so long as he instructs the
jury that they are to determine for themselves the weight
of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Obviously, this provision does not purport to define with
precision the permissible limits of the charge upon facts;
and experience in applying similar legislation demonstrates
that some room has been left for interpretation by the
appellate court. Until that body has spoken, it is safe to
assume that the trial judge will not go to extremes in seeking to find the limits of his authority. He will not state
his opinion on the weight or credibility of the evidence
or the merits of the cause, coupling his opinion with the
statement that it is not binding on the jury, in the hope
that the high court will adopt the federal practice in toto.
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Indeed, such behavior would be unwise even if it were
expressly authorized. He is an unwise judge under any
system who so far forgets his duty of impartiality and
invades the province of the jury. The facts in any case
may be left to speak for themselves and no judge brought
up in the Maryland tradition is likely to do otherwise.
On the other hand, one may venture the opinion that
the Maryland judge is not now expected to confine himself to a mere recital or recapitulation of the evidence.
The opposite is indicated by the immediate juxtaposition
in the rule of the requirement that the jury be warned that
they must decide for themselves; for this caution is unnecessary if the judge withholds all comment upon the
testimony. Indeed, the phrase, to sum up the evidence,
customarily means something more than a mere summary
of what the witnesses have said. It envisages a definition
and simplification of the issues at the outset, and "observing where the question and knot of the business lies;" 5
it includes a statement of the conflicting contentions of
the parties with reference to the evidence adduced to support them and the inferences to be drawn therefrom; and
it permits calling the attention of the jury to the possible
bias of the witness or such other relevant considerations as
may affect the value of the testimony, leaving the final
decision on this, as well as on all other questions of fact,
to the determination of the jury.
Some light is thrown upon the meaning of the new
rules by the explanatory notes published with them. We
are warned by Chief Judge Bond of the Court of Appeals
in the preface to the rules that while the explanatory notes
"are not in any sense an official construction or interpretation," they are intended to inform the profession "of the
purposes, scope and functions of the various rules and to
aid in a better understanding of them." Turning to the
notes under Rule 6, we find that reference is made to the
deficiencies of the prior practice and to the changes recommended by leaders of the Maryland Bar, and there is
quoted the following significant passage from the speech
12

HALE, HISTORY OF TIE COMMON LAW

(5th Ed., 1794), Chap. 12, p. 147.
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of Albert C. Ritchie in 1908, illustrating what the proposed
changes were designed to accomplish: 6
"It is not proposed for one instant to permit the
Court to tell the jury what they must find, nor even
to tell the jury what, in the Court's judgment, they
ought to find, or what evidence in the Court's judgment they should adopt and what they should reject.
What is proposed is this:
"At the conclusion of the case let the judge briefly
and compactly sum up and recapitulate the evidence
in all its bearings; let him give the jury the benefit of
his advice and counsel regarding it; let him indicate
to them the inferences which his own trained mind
draws from it; let him show wherein it conflicts; show
the bias of certain witnesses, and the disinterestedness
of others; show the circumstances which should induce
the jury to regard certain evidence with caution, other
evidence with favor; call attention to the fact that
some testimony is uncontradicted, other testimony
uncorroborated. In a word, let the Court draw upon
the fund of his experience, his training and his intelligence, as an aid to the jury in their deliberations,
and thus use his knowledge and his faculties where
they can do more good in the promotion of justice than
they ever could do sealed tight in the judicial breast.
"Then let the Court follow this up with a clear
statement that the comments he has just made are in
no sense binding upon the jury; that the jury are after
all the final judges of the facts; that they must find
such verdict as to them seems proper, and if their
own good judgment does not adopt the suggestions
the Court has made, then it is both their right and
their duty to follow their judgment, and disregard the
suggestions of the Court."
In paragraph four of the notes under Rule 6, the following appears:
"Under this rule, therefore, the Judge, without encroaching on the proper province of the jury, may
assist it in performing its functions. By reviewing the
evidence he may call to their attention the basic questions to be decided, and by oral instructions he can
'Ritchie,

op. cit. supra, n. 1.
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explain the law applicable to the case in plain and
understandable language and show how it applies to
the various alternatives presented by the evidence.
Both changes should make jury trial a more efficient
instrument for the administration of justice."
It seems obvious that such an interpretation will be
given to Rule 6 as will effectuate the remedial purpose
that inspired its passage.
The courts in other states have been inclined to a liberal
interpretation of constitutional or statutory provisions in
this field. A typical provision, more restrictive on its
face than Rule 6 now under consideration, is that "Judges
shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact but
may state the testimony and declare the law." It has been
held in Massachusetts that such an enactment does not
forbid comment upon the evidence. Thus in Whitney v.
Wellesley and Boston Street Railway,7 a suit for personal
injuries suffered by a passenger by the breaking of a seat
in a railway car, complaint was made that the judge dwelt
unduly on the circumstance that the plaintiff testified to
an injury to the right leg while the defendant's doctor
shortly after the accident located the injury in the left
leg. The Supreme Court said:
".. . In the construction of the statute it uniformly
has been held that, in charging juries, the judge, although prohibited from stating his opinion as to the
credibility of witnesses, may sum up the testimony
according to his recollection, submitting its effect, however, to their consideration and judgment, and leaving
to them for decision all issues of fact within their
province. He may elucidate the proper application of
the legal principles involved by illustrations drawn
from common experience, or by reference to cases
where similar questions have been decided, and define
the degree of weight which the law attaches to a
whole class of testimony. In any clear analysis of
the evidence, however impartial, the attention of the
jury necessarily must be directed to the weight and
importance of particular facts which they may find
to have been proved. If an unbiased analytical state7197 Mass. 495, 502, 84 N. E. 95 (1908).
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ment of the testimony and of the law distinctly indicates the party who is entitled to prevail, this furnishes
no just reason for the defeated party to complain,
either of the method employed or of the adverse verdict. Besides, it is not a violation of the constitutional
requirement that judges shall be as free, impartial and
independent as the lot of humanity will admit, if the
instructions, while judicially fair, are comprehensively
strong, rather than hesitatingly barren or ineffective,
and neither the tone of a charge nor the form of verbal
delivery are of themselves ground of exception, if no
error of law appears. In a word, the judge who discharges the functions of his office is, under the statute
as well as at common law, the directing and controlling
mind at the trial, and not a mere functionary to preserve order and lend ceremonial dignity to the proceedings."
Again, in Hohman v. Hemmen,s the judge was held not
to have transgressed the statute by referring to facts which
might have a bearing upon the weight to be given to the
testimony of certain police officers. The court said:
"This statute has been interpreted as restraining
judges from stating 'their own judgment or conclusion
upon matters of fact', and as including within this
prohibition expressions of opinion as to the credibility
of particular witnesses, and as to the weight to be
given to evidence when the law 'does not define the
degree of weight to be attached to it.' The statute,
however, provides expressly that judges 'may state the
testimony,' and does not restrain them from furnishing to juries 'guides or illustrations... as to weighing
the evidence of witnesses, and as to tests by which
their reliability or credibility may be determined.'"
If comment of the kind approved in these cases is permissible where the judge is expressly forbidden to charge
as to the facts and is authorized merely to state the facts,
a liberal interpretation of the authority of the Maryland
8 280 Mass. 526, 529, 182 N. E. 850 (1932).
See also, Johnson v. Foster,
221 Mass. 248, 108 N. P. 928 (1915) ; Fegan v. Quinlan, 256 Mass. 10, 13,
152 N. E. 97 (1926) ; Richards v. Munro, 30 S. C. 284, 9 S. E. 108 (1889) ;
State v. Addy, 28 S. C. 4, 13, 4 S. E. 814 (1888) ; Norris v. Clinkscales, 47
S. C. 488, 505, 25 S. E. 797 (1896) ; McClellan v. Wheeler, 70 Me. 285
(1879).
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judge "to sum up the evidence" is clearly justified. Indeed,
it was held in Tennessee, in Ivey v. Hodges,9 that "summing
up" is indicative of the English practice that allows the
judge to express an opinion on the merits of the case if
he tells the jury that his opinion is not binding upon them.
The court said:
"The 9th section of the 6th article of our constitution provides, that 'Judges shall not charge juries with
respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony
and declare the law.' This provision arose out of the
jealousy with which our ancestors always looked upon
any attempt on the part of the courts to interfere with
the peculiar province of the jury, the right to determine what facts are proved in a cause, and to put a
stop to the practice of summing up, as it was and is
yet practiced in the courts of Great Britain and in all
probability in the colonies before the revolution; and
which consists in telling the jury not what was deposed
to, but what was proved. This the framers of our
constitution considered a dangerous infraction of the
trial by jury, and have prohibited it by express terms."
Bearing in mind these illustrative decisions and particularly the terms of the rule as explained by the accompanying notes, it is not unreasonable to expect that the
trial judges will feel free to charge on the facts in the
manner most helpful to the jury.
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAw

In the same spirit the task of giving instructions on the
law will doubtless be approached. The innovation here
does not consist in the abandonment of written prayers,
setting forth the instructions on the law desired by counsel, but rather in the use to which the prayers may be put.
The introductory paragraph of the rule provides:
(a) Prayers. At the close of the evidence or at
such earlier time during the trial as the Court reasonably directs, any party may file with the Court written
prayers that the Court instruct the jury on the law as
923 Tenn. 154 (1848).
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set forth in the prayers, and shall furnish to all adverse parties copies of such prayers.
As we have seen, paragraph (b) of Rule 6 gives the
judge discretion to instruct the jury by granting (or modifying) these requested instructions; or by giving instructions of his own, or by following both of these methods,
and in any case he may give his instructions orally or in
writing or both. The practice of giving instructions on
the law by adopting or modifying prayers prepared by the
attorneys is so well known to the legal profession in Maryland, and the inherent defects and dangers of the method
have been so often discussed that nothing need be added
here. Accordingly, attention will be directed to the questions likely to arise when the judge formulates a comprehensive .charge, including his summing up of the facts,
and his instructions on the law, and gives it to the jury,
orally or in writing.
It is to be expected that at the close of the evidence, if
not before, the judge will follow the usual salutary practice of asking counsel to submit the propositions of law
which they desire him to include in his charge. It is likely
that counsel will prefer to offer formal prayers, as has been
their custom, setting out with precision the applicable rules
of law in a hypothetical framework of facts. The judge
may incorporate one or more of the prayers, as offered, in
his charge, accompanying them with explanatory comments, or as is not infrequently and, some think, preferably
done, he may reject all of the prayers, and yet use in his
own words such of the offered material as constitutes a
correct exposition of the law. The jury will more easily
understand and more readily apply the rules of the law if
they are couched in simple colloquial terms, with appropriate illustration and application to-the facts of the controversy. Any lawyer, however able, who attempts to
read the black letter of the Restatements of the Law, prepared by the leaders of the profession under the direction
of the American Law Institute, realizes how difficult it
is to understand the text without reference to the accom-
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panying comment. How much more are jurors in need
of lucid explanation. Moreover, there is an obvious advantage in a charge which contains all of the comments on
the facts and all of the instructions on the law in one coherent statement.
OBJECTIONS TO THE CHARGE

The method of taking objections to the charge is covered in paragraph (c) of the rule as follows:
(c) Objections. Before the jury retires to consider its verdict, any party may object to any portion
of any instruction given or to any omission therefrom
or to the failure to give any instruction, stating distinctly the portion or omission or failure to instruct
to which he objects and the specific grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury.
Objection may be made because of what is included in
a charge and because of what is omitted therefrom; and
failure to give an instruction is expressly made a ground
of objection. It is clear, however, that the mere failure
of a judge to include in his charge a prayer as drawn by
counsel is not necessarily reversible error, even though it
correctly sets out the law. This is because paragraph
(b) (1) of the rule authorizes the judge to prepare his own
instructions, and if these contain the substance of the
prayers that are correctly drawn, there is no error.
Objections of counsel must be addressed to the charge
as given. An objection may of course be based upon the
failure of the judge to cover in his charge the substance
of a prayer; but the objection, to be considered on appeal,
must refer not only to the prayer in question but must
state in addition the specific grounds of error involved in
its rejection. In other words, counsel must not only object
to the failure to include the material contained in the rejected prayer, but must tell the judge why his action is
erroneous. This is true not only because paragraph (c)
requires that counsel shall in each case state "the specific
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grounds of his objection," but because of the express
provisions of paragraph (d) which is as follows:
(d) Appeal. Upon appeal a party, in assigning
error in the instructions, shall be restricted to (1) the
particular portion of the instructions given or the
particular omission therefrom or the particular failure
to instruct distinctly objected to before the jury retired and (2) the specific grounds of objection distinctly stated at that time; and no other errors or assignments of error in the instructions shall be considered by the Court of Appeals.
In this connection one should bear in mind the provision in paragraph (b) (2), which is most significant of the
attitude of the Court of Appeals, that "an oral charge need
not comply with the technical rules as to prayers." By
"oral charge," the charge prepared by the judge, whether
oral or written, as distinguished from the written prayers
of counsel, is evidently intended. From the standpoint
of the jury the charge is oral whether it is read from a
prepared paper or is delivered extemporaneously by the
judge from his notes. It can hardly be supposed that strict
technical accuracy is required in one case but not in the
other. An error to be noticed must therefore be substantial. Moreover, it must be apparent to counsel and must
be pointed out to the judge before the jury retires. The
Court of Appeals adheres to the salutary and well established rule that an error which is not noticed by appellant's
attorney can hardly have prejudiced his case with the
jury. The elimination of reversals based on mere technical errors is clearly indicated. For example, if an instruction is technically incorrect in that it does not charge
all possible theories of the case or states an abstract proposition of law, or assumes or ignores or unduly emphasizes
a material fact, it will be held to be harmless error unless
the defect is called to the attention of the trial judge in
time to correct it.
Counsel are saved embarrassment and possible prejudice by the provision of the rule entitling them to an opportunity to make their objections to the charge out of
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the presence of the jury. The method of making objections is new and as we have seen it does not consist as
heretofore in merely noting an exception to the adverse
action of the judge on the written prayers. The particular
part of the charge complained of must be pointed out and
the specific error therein must be indicated. The objection
of counsel is usually made orally and incorporated in the
stenographer's notes. As pointed out by one with wide
experience as a trial lawyer in both state and federal
courts, this practice presents no real difficulty:' 0
Competent trial counsel can easily follow
the charge as given and note the substantial objections
which may arise from his point of view on the charge
as given. It is not necessary and indeed is futile to
undertake to make specific objection to mere matters
of phraseology or of small and immaterial matters.
Nearly every case depends upon not more than two
or three main points. If the trial judge has taken
a view contrary to counsel's position on these points,
it is easy enough to note the special exception thereto
and the reasons therefor. Indeed it is almost impossible to fail to note the important points on which the
judge has ruled against the lawyer's contention. The
purpose of the special exceptions is to give the judge
an opportunity to correct his charge in any particulars
called to his attention before the jury retires to consider their verdict. And only objections so specifically
made with the grounds therefor will be a basis for an
appeal."
TIME AND

Foam

OF CHARGE

The rule does not indicate whether the judge's charge
should be given before or after the argument of counsel.
Practice in this respect differs in various jurisdictions, and
while in most places the charge follows the argument, and
is required to do so by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the other method is used by a substantial number
of courts. Each method has its adherents who usually
prefer the practice to which they are accustomed. Many
1 Judge W. Calvin Chesnut, Maryland State Bar Association, June 27,
1941, The Daily Record, June 28, 1941.
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think that it is of advantage for the judge to speak last
as he will then have had the benefit of all that can be said
by the advocates for their respective sides and can also
correct, within the limits of his authority, any mistakes
that counsel may have made. On the other hand, much
benefit is derived by the jury, especially in a complicated
case, if the first person to address them after the evidence
is all in is a disinterested and impartial expert qualified
to point out the gist of the controversy and to arrange the
evidence in a systematic and orderly fashion. Under this
method counsel are fully informed of the judge's views
on the law and the facts before they speak; and this advantage is substantial, although it is not so great as it may
seem, since it is customary to give counsel advance information of the substance of the charge when it follows
the argument. If the judge speaks first, and competent
stenographers are available, there may be time to transcribe the charge during the argument, so that without
delay the jury may take the written charge with them
to their room. The rule indicates that it is within the
discretion of the judge to reduce his remarks to writing
and hand them to the jury. Undoubtedly the practice of
charging the jury before argument is more nearly akin to
the practice to which Maryland lawyers are accustomed,
and it was in vogue in the United States Courts in Maryland prior to the adoption of the new Federal Rule. On
the other hand the desirability of uniformity should not
be overlooked.
The arrangement of the charge must be left to the discretion of the individual judge. Some comment as to an
order of presentation, which has been found by experience
to be useful, may perhaps be permissible. It is well to
begin with some account of the respective functions of
court and jury, and the duties they are called upon to
perform; but comment on this matter may be brief, since
the average juror knows or quickly learns what he is expected to do. The general nature of the controversy, as
shown by the pleading and the prayers, and developed by
the testimony, may then be explained. This may be fol-
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lowed by a statement in general terms of the rules of law
involved; for example, if it be a case of personal injuries,
the fundamental rules of the law of negligence may be
set out.
Next, the judge should sum up the evidence, performing thereby the most important duty of all in some respects, since it is the evidence that gives peculiar character
to the case. It is not usually desirable to review the testimony in detail. It is sufficient to state the respective theories that the parties seek to establish with a condensed
account of the supporting evidence, emphasizing the testimony of important witnesses, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. In this connection the jury
may be furnished with guides or tests, such as the influence
of bias or personal interest, that throw light on the value
of the testimony. The judge should not be deterred by
the fear that in the course of the charge it may appear that
plaintiff or defendant has the better case. If the evidence
is fairly arrayed, first for one and then for the other, any
preference aroused in the minds of the jury springs from
the inherent nature of the case and not from the partiality
of the judge. Always the judge may take the precaution
of stating that the tendencies indicated by the evidence
are those for which the parties respectively contend, always he will tell the jury that they are the sole judges of
the facts, and always he will make the necessary corrections at the end of the charge, when requested by counsel
to do so.
The privilege and duty of charging the law in simple
understandable terms should also be accepted without
hesitation. The judge need have no fear that his deliverance will be condemned because it is not phrased in formal,
technical language, or because each sentence separated
from the context does not state a rule of law completely
with all its exceptions and qualifications. Such a feat,
well nigh impossible, would have small practical value, if
performed. The jury needs to have its attention called
to the substance of the rules in every day language, with
application to the facts of the instant case, and, if pos-
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sible, with pertinent illustrations. Here too the judge may
expect helpful suggestions from counsel at the end, which
will enable him to correct errors of commission and omission. Finally, the judge may be reassured by the evident
purpose of our highest court to ascertain in each jury trial
under review, not whether all the refinements of the law
have been observed, but whether justice in a practical
sense has been done.

